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Abstract  
From the start of the Arab revolutions in late 2010 a connection between the law, state, 
political economy, gender norms and orientalist ideology has formed the foundation of 
women’s systematic exclusion from politics. This article offers a gendered political 
reading of the concept of alienation by unmasking the processes that created the 
ideological and material conditions of externalising women’s revolutionary acts, 
estranging their political involvement and exposing them to various forms of violence. 
The article suggests that gender normative ideology’s characterisation of women’s 
images, roles and acts during and after revolutions corresponds to the most profound 
form of alienation. The article proposes that the externalisation, subjugating of women 
and objectification of their revolutionary acts are modes of alienation are necessary 
conditions for the reconfiguration of power dynamics to restore authoritarian states’ 
power. The sphere of politics, the article insinuates, not only relates to political activism 
and conflict between revolutions and counter-revolutions, it is also a battlefield for the 
(re)production of gender normative knowledge.  
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Introduction   
Despite changes over the last few decades in the Arab region concerning women’s 
rights and political participation, to varying degrees from one country to another, the 
states’ governing principle values men over women. This principle can be clearly seen 
in women’s legal status. For example, guardianship provisions give male relatives 
authority over women: male relatives have the right to determine women’s choice of 
study, marriage, mobility, and so on (Jabiri, 2016 & 2013). Furthermore, citizenship 
laws often treat women as secondary citizens, as such laws not only prevent women 
from passing their nationality to their husbands and children, but also construct women 
as subordinate subjects (Joseph, 2000). This is in addition to a whole set of decency 
laws, modesty laws and customary practices that attribute honour and public morality 
to women’s acts and behaviours, policing women in both the public and private spheres 
(Jabiri, 2016; Hélie, 2012; Hoodfar and Ghoreishian, 2012).  
 
There are extensive examinations of the processes of perpetuating women’s 
subordinate position in relation to culture, religion, nationalist movements, and the 
state’s alliance with tribes and other conservative groups (See: Al-Rasheed. 2013; 
Charrad, 2000 & 2001; Joseph, 2000; Kandiyoti, 1991, 1992, 2001; Hatem, 1995). Less 
consideration has been paid to how the state and its apparatuses mediate the realisation 
of women, as a category, through the production of gender normative ideology – where  
women are depicted as minor subjects and, ironically, also symbolise public modesty 
and honour	 (Hélie, 2012; Hoodfar and Ghoreishian, 2012) – as well as the extent to 
which these processes have aimed and contributed to estranging women from politics.  
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Whilst women’s historical role in politics and revolution in the region cannot be denied, 
their limited gains – whether in terms of low representation or restricted rights – raises 
questions around the efficacy of gendered political processes in pushing women away 
from politics. I engage with this question through examining the concept of women’s 
alienation and estrangement from their political roles in the Arab revolutions. I look at 
how political processes and forces are gendered, and how alienation is used in the 
reshaping and reproduction of the social norms that govern women’s lives and activities 
during and beyond revolution.   
 
Feminist scholarship has examined the post-revolution processes and shifts that 
exposed women to various forms of violence and the marginalisation of their agendas 
(El-Mahdi, 2012; Al-Ali, 2012 & 2014; Kandyioti 2011, 2012 & 2013; Johansson-
Nogués, 2013; Amar, 2012), I, however, take a relatively neglected point of departure, 
especially vis-à-vis the estrangement of women from politics for the purpose of 
restoring power by examining processes of alienating women through the 
objectification of women’s acts and contribution to revolution-making, and strategies 
of state and its counter revolution’s allies to galvanise the public and reproduce gender 
normativity. I particularly take the case of Egypt to examine processes of excluding 
women political activists through three modes of alienation. This includes the 
externalisation, subjugation, and objectification of women’s revolutionary acts-that 
moulded women’s power and needs as distinctly different from those of men, justified 
and legitimised, different forms of violence against women.  
 
The three modes of alienation developed, refined and adapted from Karl Marx theory 
of alienation, for the purpose of scrutinising the ways in which gender norms and 
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relations were key to constituting women’s basic relationship with the revolution, along 
with the unique conditions under which the alienation of women from politics intend 
to restore old power hierarchies and structures. Examining Egyptian women activists' 
estrangement from politics through the concept of alienation contributes into the 
politicisation of the construction and reproduction of gender norms and locating 
violence against women activists within political practices of restoring power.  So 
rather than examining cultural and social processes that construct gender normativity, 
I, by relating to Marx theory of alienation, bring new accounts of how the sphere of 
politics not only relates to conflict between revolutions and counter-revolutions, it is 
also a battlefield for the (re)production of gendered knowledge. By this, I aim to show 
that gender norms and relations are not only shaped by politics but also somehow 
constitute a crucial part of the region’s politics and order.  
 
This article is based on and heavily influenced by my own activism in the Arab region, 
particularly over the last four years, when I worked closely with women’s activists in 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Jordan. Over that time, I participated in several conferences 
and workshops in the region, which included,  three workshops and trainings for 
Egyptian women’s rights activists; and two regional trainings held in Tunisia and Egypt 
in cooperation with the Centre for Arab Women Training and Research (CAWTR). In 
addition, I  participated in several regional meetings on women in post-revolution 
societies.  In March 2015, I led the Arab Women’s Network’s (Roa’a) delegation – 
composed of activists from Jordan, Bahrain, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, Palestine, and 
Syria – to the United Nations’ 59th Session of the Commission on the Status of Women 
(CSW). 
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Alienation,	Politics	and	the	Reproduction	of	Gender	Norms				
	
In Marx’s conceptualisation, alienation is the process of workers’ objectification within 
the production process, where the ‘object which labour produces stands in opposition 
to the worker as an alien thing’ (Marx, 1967: 58-59).  In the capitalist system, alienation 
is about disconnecting workers from power politics: the system treats the worker as a 
thing, turning him/her into a commodity, a valueless self, to the extent that ‘the more 
objects the worker produces the less he can possess and the more he falls under 
domination’ (Ibid.: 78).   
 
For Marx, alienation is insidious and dangerous because it makes ‘all of this appear 
normal and even natural’ (Kain, 1993: 124). Alienation of the worker from his/her 
product and production activity, which in turn alienates him/her from his/her human 
nature, may not appear to him/her as a form oppression or domination. In this sense, 
the oppressor is unlikely to be identified, as no one observes that alienation is the 
product of a particular form of power relations and human interactions. Hence, Marx 
uses the concept of alienation to disrupt the normalised relationships within labour 
production process (Ibid.).  
 
Socialist and Marxist feminists have adapted and developed the normalised relation 
between the oppressed and the oppressor in Marx’s theory of alienation (Klotz, 2006; 
Foreman, 1977; MacKinnon, 1989 & 1982; Jaggar, 1982; Kain, 1993). Socialist 
feminists, such as Anna Foreman (1977), have tried to unmask the question of women’s 
oppression by positing femininity, in and of itself, as a form alienation. Hence, the 
realisation of women’s selfhood is a mode of alienation that results in women’s 
agreement with their modes of objectification (Ibid). Marxist feminists, on the other 
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hand, have provided a theoretical framework for women’s oppression by questioning 
whether the relationship between sexuality, house-work (as forms of labour), 
domination, and the objectification of women is a form of alienation (MacKinnon, 1989 
& 1982; Jaggar, 1982; Kain, 1993).  
 
Feminists’ work on alienation – although limited to house-work, child-care, sexuality, 
and property rights – has allowed for new conceptualisations of, and engagement with, 
the concept in other areas where domination is used to estrange women from their own 
activities, subjugate them, and objectify their sense of self. As such, I develop a 
gendered political reading of alienation by examining how women’s relationship with 
politics (as a form of production process) is normalised as something irrelevant to 
women’s nature and interests, and hence foreign to them. I scrutinise how women’s 
role in the Arab revolutions is normalised through alienation to serve authoritarian 
states’ power restoration. I suggest that the gender normative ideology’s 
characterisation of women’s images, roles and acts during and after revolutions 
corresponds to the most profound form of alienation.  
 
However, all of this begs the question: to what extent can politics be treated as a 
production process and women’s engagement from politics as a form of labour? Marx 
suggests that the alienation of workers from their products aims to disconnect them 
from their power over their products and the reproduction process as a whole; a process 
that disengages workers from their fellow workers and their own human activities and 
keeps wealth and politics concentrated in the hands of a bourgeois group. By the same 
token it is possible to suggest that if women’s role in politics (be it in the form of 
protesting, voting, membership in political parties and unions, etc.) is recognised and 
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not estranged, such could result in women gaining power over their actions and selves, 
accessing leadership positions, reforming laws, and so forth. This could eventually lead 
to an alteration of the masculine order. Therefore, change at the level of who actively 
contributes to  political processes is crucial to who has access to resources and control 
over material conditions, and vice versa. Such a transformation may not only have 
implications for gender relations, but also for the political order. Hence, externalisation 
and exceptionalism of women revolution-making, the first mode of alienation, is a 
necessary condition for excluding women from politics to serve the authoritarian state’s 
restoration of power.  
 
One of the significant points to make here is the more women are active, as I will 
examine in details, the harsher are the strategies used to alienate them from their 
activism through subjugating them to various forms of violence, the second mode of 
alienation. This mode of alienation aims to push women to a state like the 
workers/product relation, wherein ‘the more objects the worker produces the less he 
can possess’ (Marx: 78, 1967), a relationship that is shaped by the exploitation of the 
worker. For Marx, exploitation forms the foundation of labour power and workers’ 
alienation, where the worker is exploited by his/her own activity (control of workers’ 
creativity, time and physical energy)(Ibid). Women’s active role in revolutions 
resembles the object of labour, and consequently, alienation can be useful to shed lights 
on the ways by which women, instead of seeing the results of their active political role 
in the revolution, the world of politics, and indeed the revolution that they contributed 
into its creation, are somehow become more alien , less belong to them as their own, 
and hence they become less influential and more vulnerable to violence and 
exploitation. Accordingly, the greater women’s active role in politics the more they are 
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subjugated and exposed to violence. In this mode, sexual assaults, and other forms of 
violence, against women political activists that are examined in this article, are meant 
to contain women’s revolutionary acts and exclude them from power politics.   
  
Objectification in Marx theory means the more value the worker creates and produces 
‘the less valueless, and the more unworthy he becomes….the more ingenious labour 
becomes, the less ingenious  becomes the worker  and the more he becomes nature’s 
servant’ (Marx, 78, 2009). The direct relationship between worker and the labour is the 
production of the worker’s self. The production of workers’ self as a machine, for Marx, 
is an essential element of labour power and control over the means of production. In 
this process, the worker is not only foreign to his/her product and exploited by it, but 
also alienated from his/her human activity and fellow humans.  Similarly, it is possible 
to insinuate that women’s relationship with the revolution, is produced through 
normalisation of politics; as something irrelevant to women’s nature and interests, and 
hence foreign to them. In this sense, women’s role is more intrinsic, as more related to 
their natural characteristics, and thus different from that of men. The objectification of 
women’s act of revolution- the third mode of alienation- works to reproduce gender 
norms to alienate women from their humanity, as they less belong to the world of 
politics, to maintain control over the revolution and its results.  
 
In addition to using the three modes of alienation to elucidate and uncover the processes 
that created the ideological and material conditions of women’s alienation, estranging 
their political involvement and exposing them to various forms of violence, the other 
significant aspect of using the concept of alienation is related to what Marx incites us 
to think of alienation as illusionary and, thus, not an expression of reality. Hence, 
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bursting the illusion surrounding women’s political roles and contributions, and thus 
identifying modes and strategies of alienation, could have severe implications for 
authoritarian regimes and institutions, particularly when the realisation of self as active 
and valuable transforms into a means for political and social change (Marx, 1967; 
Ollman, 1971).  Consequently, using alienation as a theoretical framework not only 
provides a better understanding of the revolutions’ results, but can also offer guidance 
in gendering politics, politicising gender normative ideology and baring the reasoning 
and justification of discriminatory laws and gender based violence practices, as based 
on religion and culture.  
 
Women’s	Sense	of	Loss	and	Despair			
 
Before the revolutions, the region was going through a ‘crisis of authority’ (Gramsci, 
1971, p. 274): authoritarian regimes still dominated power, but were no longer believed 
to be serving the people’s interests.  This crisis of authority was brought on by decades 
of dictatorship and neoliberal policies of privatisation, which had led to a concentration 
of wealth and pushed the majority deep into poverty; foreign interventions, the United 
States-led coalition and war against terror, which legitimised the invasion of Iraq – one 
of the most powerful countries in the region – and resulted in its destruction; and a lack 
of both regional and international political will to achieve a just solution to Palestinians. 
Under such political and economic conditions, any attempt at change was suppressed 
before it could mature and, sometimes, buried before it was born. This crisis lay in the 
fact that, as Gramsci put it, ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born’ (Gramsci, 
1971, p. 276).  
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The start of the Arab revolutions was very promising; it led to the overthrown of the 
dictatorships in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia. But perhaps more importantly, 
revolution promoted the slogan of ‘justice, freedom, and liberty’ and consequently 
encouraged the duplication of the revolution in other countries in the region. For 
women’s rights groups, in particular, the revolutions were not only about regime 
change; these momentous occasions also implied the voicing of women’s concerns and 
the genuine consideration of equality. Many women activists had hoped that their long 
sought change was now closer than ever. One activist from Egypt shared her thoughts 
with me during the revolution: ‘The change we have seen is unimaginable. What we 
have been longing for is coming true. What has happened in Egypt will certainly be 
echoed elsewhere in the region.’ A Tunisian activist stated: ‘We are living a dream. Our 
voice is so loaded that no one will ever dare to disregard it again.’ As women rejoiced 
in the atmosphere of change and a profound sense of hope for a better future, no one 
expected or anticipated a reversal in the spheres of political activism and women’s 
rights.   
 
Four years later, we have seen the revolutions’ dramatic turn toward the antithesis of 
their demands and slogans: people have been forced to choose between military rule 
and the Islamic extremism of Da’ish, and such choices have unleashed turmoil across 
the region and drastically altered women’s sentiments towards the revolutions. On 16 
April 2015, Khadija Besikry – the well-known Libyan writer and activist who 
participated in Libya’s revolution from the start, mobilising people through her poems, 
writings, and activism – wrote on her Facebook page: 
I apologise to you. For every word of hope I wrote, I apologise. For every dream, I 
dreamt and shared with you, I apologise.  For your illusions, I apologise.  For my 
belonging, adoration and love for this country, I apologise. For all my desires, I 
apologise. For my life, I apologise.  
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On 24 January 2015, the political activist Shaima’ Al-Sabagh was gunned down in a 
peaceful demonstration honouring the martyrs of Egypt’s 25 January revolution. 18 
activists, including Azza Soliman, stepped forward to provide witness testimony as to 
the unlawful killing of Al-Sabagh; however, when these activists volunteered their 
testimony to the police, they were quickly turned from witnesses into defendants. In 
March 2015, Egyptian women’s organisations and activists put out a statement in 
support of Soliman and the 17 other wrongfully accused political activists, imploring: 
‘Do not persecute hope.’ Egyptian activists see the persecution of Azza Soliman – a 
representative of women’s voices in the revolution – as a silencing and betrayal of 
women’s demands after their crucial role in the revolution. Zeinab Al-Mahdi, the young 
Egyptian activist, who had repeatedly described the revolution as: ‘my first love’. 
Zeinab, who lived the revolution from day one and was emotionally connected to every 
aspect of those 18 days in Tahrir Square, was so disappointed and enraged that she 
committed suicide in November 2014 with the words: ‘There is no justice, and I realise 
that. Victory is not coming. We are deceiving ourselves so we can survive’ (Ayman, 
2014). Zeinab’s reaction to the loss of her first love was extreme. However, hers was 
the strong statement of a jobless, lower-class woman who had truly believed justice was 
within her grasp; when suddenly left with no option, she refused to be alien from her 
first love and chose to protest one last time with her own life.   
 
One feels the sense of loss in both Khadija’s and Zeinab’s words and the Egyptian 
women’s statement; the same sentiment can also be felt when speaking to diverse 
women, and people generally, from such post-revolutionary contexts, whether at a 
conference, in the streets or public transport, in shops, on social media or in newspapers. 
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Many people, whether in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya or elsewhere in the region, now 
make comments such as: ‘democracy does not suit Arab people’; ‘the Arab spring was 
rather an Arab autumn’; or even that the revolutions were nothing but a ‘Western 
conspiracy’. Such expressions beg the question: what has alienated and estranged the 
people of the revolution to such a degree that they now oppose their own revolution? 
How has the revolution been so diverted that it has become independent of its people, 
as ‘a thing lying outside of their control’ (Marx, 1967, p. 87)?  
 
One way of answering these questions is to look at the ways by which states and counter 
revolution forces have played off social norms to galvanise public opinion against the 
revolution-makers. As Gramsci posits, hegemony does not only establish its order by 
force or from outside; instead, hegemony is established from within, by creating a 
common sense and consent to its ideology (Gramsci, 1971). As Bayat (2015) further 
explains, hegemony can only succeed in authoritarian states ‘by weaving its logic — 
through norms, relations, and institutions — into the social fabric’. In this vein, I aim 
to examine the extent to which the recalling and reproduction of gender normative 
ideologies was part and parcel of restoring the hegemonic social and political order in 
Egypt. To put this into more concrete terms, in what follows, I discuss the three 
developed gendered modes of alienation: the alienation of women’s act of revolution 
through the externalisation and exceptionalisation of these acts; the alienation of 
women through their subjection to sexual and physical violence; and the alienation of 
women from their human activity and essence through the objectification and 
commodification of women and their bodies.  
 
Mode of Externalisation and Exeptionalisation of Women’s Revolution-Making  
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There is not a clear trajectory for the ways in which women were estranged from 
political participation and engagement with the revolutions. At various stages of the 
revolutions, women were central and gender norms used to create public discontent 
with either the revolution itself, the old regime, or Islamic parties. However, the 
centrality of the women’s question in the political sphere could be understood as no 
more than 'moments within’ the phases of changeable politics. 
 
At the outset of Egypt’s revolution, women on the frontlines were portrayed as 
‘Westerns’ and ‘foreigners’ with respect to Egyptian culture and society. State-owned 
TV stations and controlled newspapers depicted women revolutionaries as ‘prostitutes’ 
who joined the revolution in order to have sexual relationships and behave ‘immorally’ 
according to Egyptian culture; even some celebrities helped to propagate this message. 
In the first two weeks of the revolution, state-owned TV channels aired programmes 
with celebrities – such as actors, actresses and football players – who accused men and 
women of going to Tahrir Square for sex and drugs. The TV presenter of the ‘Cairo 
Today’ programme described male revolutionaries as physical and political 
mukhanathin (mollycoddle or effeminate men). Analytical programmes on Egyptian 
TV often and repeatedly asked their guests questions about the extent to which women 
who demonstrated and camped in tents in Tahrir Square were Egyptian.  
 
For years, state-owned and regulated media had systematically denied the people’s 
voice and backed the regime (See Matter, 2011 &2011; Peterson, 2011). During the 18 
days of revolution, such media continued to supress the people’s voice through 
narratives that dehumanised and externalised the act of the revolution (Hamody & 
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Gomaa, 2012). Moreover, by playing the moral and gender ideology card, the regime 
intended to alienate women’s revolutionary acts from Egyptian culture as a whole, de-
masculinise men and, hence, alienate people from the revolution. The act of revolution 
was portrayed as an act of immorality that society should condemn. 
 
As the revolution progressed, the number of women exceeded all expectation and the 
revolution gained both military and international support, the media shifted its 
discourse. Now women were being portrayed as partners in the revolution, but gender 
was still present in every aspect of this representation. Women’s participation was 
always depicted in relation to men. Media headlines included titles such as ‘women 
supported men’ and ‘women stood behind or beside men’, emphasising their roles as 
mothers, wives, and sisters over their involvement as citizens. In this narrative, a 
woman ‘is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference 
to her… he is the absolute – she is the other’ (de Beauvoir, 1949, p. 16).   
 
For women’s act to be seen only as relative to men is an act of alienation and 
estrangement intended to bring women closer to gender normative roles and keep them 
removed from politics. Whilst women’s participation could not be ignored, it could be 
located within a particular framework of gender normativity. When the United States 
and the military turned their support to the revolution, the regime had lost its strongest 
allies and regime change was imminent.  Therefore, the celebration of women’s 
participation was part and parcel of the political shift at this stage of the revolution. 
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Another aspect of the gender discourse was displayed through the picture of Mubarak 
and his sons dressed in women’s garments in social media and newspapers. This widely 
circulated image was intended to mock Mubarak and his sons: Mubarak had been 
relegated from the strong man to a ‘lowly’ woman; he no longer had anything to do 
with the position of power. Besides downgrading Mubarak from his political status, the 
image also had patronising and disciplining purposes. It showed men who abuse power 
as detached from masculinity, associating them instead with femininity as a form of 
punishment aimed at perpetuating the supremacy of men. In this logic, femininity 
represented immorality, corruption, and abuse of power. Such a representation 
resonates with ideological gender normativity, depicting the masculine as uncorrupted, 
competent and honourable, while the feminine embodies the converse. Deeming 
women’s interpersonal relations as inferior and degrading their political roles aimed to 
disregard all the peculiarities of women’s abilities – as both humans and citizens – and 
reinstitute women’s alienation from power politics.    
 
In the first phase of the revolution, the representation of women and gender roles used 
soft means to reproduce gender normative ideology, whether through attempting to 
demoralise the revolution by externalising women’s act of revolution or celebrating and 
exceptionalising women’s participation. Women’s participation was exceptionalised 
through describing it as something ‘new’, a form of ‘awakening’, or the tendency to 
limit women’s contribution to a few exceptional heroines (Al-Ali, 2013; Abu Lughod, 
2011; El-Mahdi, 2012), which coincided with and echoed orientalist discourses and 
alienated other women from their own forms of resistance and contributions to the 
revolution.   
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According to this logic, the activity of producing the revolution was seen as first 
belonging to men and then to particular, individual women. While these discourses 
might seem contradictory, in fact they normalise women’s essence and nature as 
incompatible with politics and revolution-making. Hence, acts of externalisation, 
exceptionalisation and celebration were no more than forms of estranging women from 
their own history of struggle, potentialities, abilities and human essence. This discourse 
negates women’s activism in Egypt throughout history, as well as denies their 
significant contribution and role in the struggle for independence, within the nationalist 
movement and beyond in Egypt (see among others Al-Ali, 2000; Badran, 1996; Baron, 
2006; Lewis, 2012).  
 
Mode of Subjugating Revolutionary Women 
The transition period – after Mubarak’s resignation through the first presidential 
election in 2012 – was a time of hostile and hard forms of alienating women.  The shift 
from soft to hard means was clear through the emergence of systematic sexual violence 
against women in protests.  In this period, there was an informal alliance between the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forced (SCAF), which was ruling Egypt, and the 
Islamic Brotherhood Party, which was expected to win the first post-revolution 
presidential and parliamentary elections. During this time, women protesters were 
targeted by the police and security forces, and subjected to forms of violence that varied 
from verbal harassment, physical and sexual assault, and accusations of performing 
immoral acts (Nazra et al., 2014, p. 11).  Islamic parties legitimised these brutalities 
against women through the discourse of the Egyptian people’s morality and religiosity.  
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The military and Islamic parties were clearly in agreement in arguing that women 
protesting was causing a decline in public morals, which was embodied by the ‘virginity 
tests’ and brutality of security forces against women protestors. In March 2011, 17 
women protesters, including female journalists, were described to the public as 
‘strangers to the Egyptian community’ (Baha’Iz Al-Arab, 2014). In order to justify the 
security forces’ acts of sexual harassment and assault, these women were forced to 
submit to virginity tests. A SCAF senior general stated about the women: ‘The girls 
who were detained were not like your daughter or mine. These were girls who had 
camped out in tents with male protesters in Tahrir Square’ (Ibid.). This statement held 
several political and gender normative implications. Firstly, by describing activists as 
girls rather than women, the military intended to influence the public to view women 
as minors and, hence, imply that acts of protesting were merely acts of naiveté. 
Secondly, the statement ‘they are not like your daughters or mine’ was intended to send 
a strong message to Egyptian families: women who protest lack morals, and it is a 
family’s responsibility to discipline their daughters. Therefore, these 17 women did not 
hail from respectable families or fit the image of good daughters, so they deserved to 
be disciplined and tamed. The statement sought to remind families to adhere to their 
responsibilities, toe the military line and suppress women. Furthermore, this statement 
also reiterated the Mubarak regime’s discourse of externalising women’s act of 
revolution in order to tighten security measures, justify sexual assaults committed by 
the security forces, and limit the act of protesting to those who lacked morals and 
decency. De-moralising women protesters in this way was intended to denigrate the act 
of protesting itself. The political sphere had changed and this change needed to be 
understood by people. Therefore, SCAF’s ultimate goal was to end street protests and 
rationalise and legitimise their atrocious actions against those who did not comply.  
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At this stage, the state and SCAF aimed to alienate women protesters through the 
systematic abuse of their bodies. However, acts of sexual harassment, rape and abuse 
were not done merely to punish women activists; these acts were also a direct threat to 
other women and intended to shift women’s role from active participant to passive 
victim. Alas, women’s act of revolution has now become something to avoid simply to 
stay alive and escape punishment. By 2014, in addition to hundreds of sexual and 
physical assaults by individual men or the security forces, NGOs had documented 500 
cases of mob sexual harassment and rape in Tahrir Square and other political spaces. 
Many such mob attacks were videoed, and some were aired live on television 
(International Federation for Human Rights, 2015, p. 6). In January 2013, the activist 
Azza Balbaa shared her opinion: ‘What happened was not merely sexual harassment; 
it was an intentional move to scare women from political life and from Tahrir Square’ 
(Nazra et al., 2014, p. 3). 
  
The purposefulness of these attacks is clear from their collective/mass form, which 
were frequently described by survivors as follows: during protests, an individual man 
would start both verbally harassing and physically attacking a female protester, then 
other men would join him and form a circle around the woman; some of these men 
would try to convince the woman that they were there to protect her and push her away 
from the crowd, but would then physically assault her themselves (Ibid.). Videos of 
sexual harassment and rape would sometimes show more than 20 men simultaneously 
assaulting one woman. Such videos also showed people passing by assaults without 
intervening and police ignoring women’s cries for help. Some women also accused the 
police of directly participating in such acts (Ibid.). 
	 19	
 
Unfortunately, sexual harassment is not a new phenomenon in Egypt. However, the 
escalation of this harassment during the protests in Tahrir Square, particularly during 
the SCAF rule, gave the attacks more of a political tone than just simply sexual-related 
crimes. There are several issues that show the link between the use of gender 
normativity, sexual harassment and power restoration. First, perpetrators systematically 
instrumentalised the concept of protection in order to trick women. In ‘ordinary’ 
harassment scenarios, male witnesses – despite being complete strangers to the woman 
involved – often take on the role of protector and intervene. This is part and parcel of 
the Egyptian popular symbol ibn el-balad (son of the nation). Sometimes, even if a man 
himself practises harassment, he will not tolerate or remain silent when witnessing 
harassment by another man.  Hence, victims of sexual harassment in Tahrir were 
deceived by the invocation of the concept of protection, as the women believed that 
such was integral to men’s masculinity; failing to provide women with protection, it 
was thought, challenged the essence of men and the values associated with masculinity.   
 
Taking all this into consideration, can we now consider that these acts form the basis 
of a transformation in masculinity, or that Egyptian ‘masculinity is in crisis’ (Amar, 
2011)? In this case, the answer is certainly no, as these ‘un-masculine’ acts somehow 
related to gendered state violence against women. They were deliberate and intentional 
acts of abuse on behalf of a regime looking to punish women. The perpetrators were 
merely gangs, like actors, who enacted the regime’s desire of pushing women away 
from politics. Masculinity is not the concern here, particularly the one represented by 
the image of ibn el-balad. The regime used sexual harassment as a political tool to 
punish women, alienate their political participation and, perhaps most importantly, 
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transform the image of the revolution from peaceful to aggressive; thus, making it alien 
to the general public. This case reconfirms that gender norms can be played off by 
states; the state is unconcerned with protecting some features of masculinity when its 
political and economic interests are at stake. In such a situation, the state bypasses or 
even sacrifices some of its own gender norms to reinforce those that suit its current 
politics.   
 
Second, the videos’ clarity of picture, sound and meticulous filming – perpetrators’ and 
victims’ voices and faces were clearly recognisable – was meant to frighten women and 
precisely convey the price a woman might pay if she participated in protests. Ironically, 
but given the political nature of the act not surprisingly, even though perpetrators’ faces 
were clearly visible in these videos, only one person has been prosecuted for these 
crimes as of May 2015. Although there were a few official statements by presidents 
Morsi and Sisi, or announcements of pending investigations, as of May 2015 no man 
has been brought to justice for participating in mob assaults. 
 
Punishing women and giving license to perpetrators to harass and rape with impunity 
gave the message that women were to blame and intended to push Egyptian society to 
further limit women’s movement. Four young activists in Egypt told me that their 
family members (fathers, brothers, mothers, grandparents, etc.) began further 
restricting their movement after these attacks were shown on television and widely 
circulated on social media. An activist from Alexandria said, ‘those of us who persisted 
in our act of revolution were seen by the public as seekers of sexual harassment, as if it 
was something we wanted, and so instead of blaming the criminals we were held 
responsible.’ Another activist said that her neighbour gave her the following an 
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unsolicited advice: ‘You should stop going to Tahrir Square. You know if you go to the 
protest you will be sexually harassed, and yet you still go. How should people 
understand this other than you want to be harassed?’  
 
Some families, as a measure of precaution, arranged marriages for their daughters or 
forced them to leave university. According to Azza Soliman, the director of the Centre 
for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA), CEWLA documented numerous 
cases of early and forced marriages of young women protestors and activists, which 
their families had justified under the rubric of protection. Therefore, sexual harassment 
was not only a heinous crime in and of itself, it was also a strategy of estranging 
women’s political roles to transform the image of women from political activists into 
victims of sexual harassment; it both punished women who continued to protest and 
threatened those who even thought about following in their footsteps. In this sense, 
women’s sexual situation in the revolution ‘resembles that of wage workers who are 
alienated from the process and product of their labour’ (Jaggar, 1982, p. 309).  Hence, 
women were forced into being preoccupied with how to stay alive, protect their being, 
and ensure safety from sexual harassment; for some, this preoccupation has become so 
central to life that all other demands or rights are seen as luxuries, exemplifying 
women’s alienation from politics and their own potentials; a status that is similar to the 
exploitation of worker by the labour power.  
 
In a different vein, mass acts of sexual harassment have served orientalist cultural 
arguments: such incidents are used as evidence of the aggressive nature of Arab men 
and the passive victimhood of Arab women, suggesting that ‘people of the region were 
not ready to govern themselves in a civil democratic fashion’ (Amar, 2012). Crimes of 
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sexual harassment, together with the unrest in the region, as a whole, reinvigorated 
orientalists to rethink the notion of ‘Arab revolution’, question whether the region was 
ready for democracy, and doubt the applicability of the Western model of governance 
to a region with no history of civilised movements. Consequently, such acts were used 
to depict Arabs or Muslims as uncivilised, demonise the revolution and relocate the 
people’s power; orientalists deemed Western democracy and rule of law to be 
irreconcilable with the ‘barbaric’ nature of ‘these’ people. In this sense, acts that served 
to help restore the old regime’s power and alienate the people from their revolution 
also, simultaneously, aided the orientalist discourse in its dehumanisation of the people 
of the region. 
 
Mode of Objectification of Women’s Act of Revolution  
After Mubarak’s resignation, a trend appeared of pointing to women’s rights as part of 
Mubarak’s socially corrupt policies. Such accusations were particularly directed at 
Mubarak’s wife, Suzanne Mubarak, as laws related to the family, women’s 
parliamentary quotas, and the National Council of Women’s empowerment 
programmes were attributed to her. Such a trend both denied the history of women’s 
struggle and activism in Egypt and linked women’s rights to the old regime (Al-Ali 
2012, 2014); such a linkage was intended to mobilise Egyptians against the notion of 
women’s rights and estrange gender equality from the new era of the revolution.  
 
In its manifesto, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – the Islamist party that won the 
first parliamentary and presidential elections after the overthrown of Mubarak – 
indicated that a return to family values was one of its core principles (FJP’s Manifesto, 
2011), as the imbalance between women’s rights and family duties was attributable to 
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the ‘systematic corruption’ of the family during the Mubarak era (Al-Azbawi, 2012). 
This statement held numerous practical implications for women; first amongst them 
being a potential reform of the family law, which could have catastrophic effects on the 
age of marriage, custodianship and divorce laws, particularly khulu (divorce initiated 
by women). The message that this manifesto imparted was that social corruption, 
immorality and the absence of family values were all associated with women’s rights. 
For the Party, no women’s rights should surpass their family duties and ‘Islamic 
values’.  
 
In its first few months in office, the Party made a noticeable and symbolic gesture: it 
removed the picture of Doria Shafik, a feminist activist crucial to the mobilisation for 
universal suffrage in the 20th century, from civic education text books (Tadros, 2013). 
Based on their understanding of religion, it was clear that the Party planned to 
undermine women’s role in politics and reinstate the centrality of their family roles as 
part of its overall agenda of implementing sharia law, which around 41% of the 
Egyptian public voted for in the first parliamentary election. Egyptians were portrayed 
during this time, in both the national and international media, as ‘religious by nature’ 
(FJP Manifesto, 2011, p. 25). Such a depiction meant to naturalise the election results 
and the presumably inescapable trajectory that the revolution was taking. 
 
Women and their roles were integral to the process of naturalising Egypt as an Islamic 
nation, even though neither Islam nor Islamic discourses had been prevalent in the 
revolution or revolution-making. Likewise, women’s rights and the fear of 
retrogression were part of the counter-Islamist movement established to take down 
President Morsi. After a conflict between the SCAF and Freedom and Justice Party 
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over institutions and decision-making, the media suddenly adopted a feminist approach 
to women’s rights. In 2012 and 2013, women and the counter-Islamist movement – 
including old regime supporters, business men affected by the Party’s economic 
policies, and the military – demonstrated dozens of times demanding the preservation 
of women’s rights.  
 
The relationship between the women’s question and politics is clearly very complex. 
The centrality of women’s issues in the Tamarod (rebel) movement, which continually 
emphasised the Freedom and Justice Party’s intention to reverse women’s rights, along 
with the extreme forms of physical and sexual violence experienced by women in the 
30 June demonstrations, could shed light on some of the contradictions related to the 
use of women’s rights and bodies in different political phases. In this instance, while 
women’s rights were politically and discursively central, women’s bodies were exposed 
to extreme forms of violence. Furthermore, it is also interesting that after the 2014 
presidential elections, there was no longer a need for the women’s liberation argument; 
instead, modesty and morals returned to dominate discussions on women’s rights.  
 
As can be seen, claims for a return to family values or demands for women’s equality 
have both been part of political agendas that were rejected or welcomed based on 
particular political events and purposes. Indeed, as opposed to the previously claimed 
‘religious nature’ of the Egyptian people, their ‘new’ characteristic has now emerged 
as ‘military sympathiser by nature’ or having an ‘incontestable loyalty to the military’. 
At this stage, when the military sought to usurp and delegitimise President Morsi, the 
media did not criticise or challenge women’s acts – such as dancing in the streets, 
protesting with men, or taking off the hijab – but instead cheered them on. Such acts 
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were seen as forms of resistance against the Freedom and Justice Party’s attempt to 
Islamise Egypt; issues of morals or Egyptian values and traditions were not mentioned. 
This shows that shifts in the media’s representation of events, particularly in relation to 
gender, are directly linked to the media’s changing relationship with the state. 
 
In an article published in Al-Monitor in 2014, ‘Did the election spark “dancing 
revolution” in Egypt’, Wala Hussein concluded:  
The dancing scenes by Egyptian women to the tune of national songs in front of 
polling stations can be explained in several ways: they can be a substitute for 
demonstrating, which has become a crime; they can also be a way to taunt political 
rivals; they can serve as a tool to mobilize women because women imitate each other 
by nature. Thus, group dancing quickly spread as a contagion at the polling stations. 
 
Here, Hussein suggests that women’s dancing is a political act representing the post-
revolution era. In other words, dancing replaced demonstrating and was meant to 
encourage women to take to the streets in support of President Sisi; but most 
importantly, Hussein points to dancing as an act of political cunning. Mariz Tadros also 
emphasises this point: she describes women’s dancing as to ‘spite the brothers’ (Tadros, 
2014). This act of political cunning was intended to redefine the ‘spirit of nation’, in 
contrast with the Muslim brothers. In this context, such a contrast could only be shown 
through women, as they are uniquely capable of performing the act of cunning, a 
traditionally feminine trait. Here, the use of women’s bodies through the act of dancing 
was meant to symbolise the new spirit of the nation, affront the brothers, show support 
and sympathy with the army, and signal a ‘social contract with El-Sisi’ (Ibid). For 
women to show their sympathy and political support through dancing, rather than 
through the ballot box, was certainly intended to relocate and transform women’s 
position from political activist to dancer, from active participant to sexual commodity.  
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Undoubtedly, this shift in image had practical effects on women’s political 
participation. A week after the presidential election, I held a focus group with women 
from the Egyptian Women’s Voices Organisation – a small charitable organisation 
based in one of the poorest neighbourhoods in Cairo, which mainly provides women 
with small credits – as part of a study I was commissioned to do for the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development on ‘Women’s Economic Participation, Agency, 
and Choice in Egypt and Jordan’.  In the focus group, women repeatedly spoke about 
how it had become increasing difficult, even non-desirable, for them to express interest 
in politics, participate in demonstrations, or vote in elections. One woman said this was 
due to: ‘The embarrassing behaviour of women and all of the dancing that women did 
at polling stations.’  In what was intended as a funny comment, another woman spoke 
about how boys now mock each other by saying, ‘You, who your mum participated in 
the elections’; this statement should be understood as ‘your mother is a dancer’.   
 
Both projects – applying sharia and de-Islamising Egypt – show the significance of 
gender discourses, as well as how gender normative views change and are 
instrumentalised to mobilise the people. Whilst both projects have supporters, they still 
only represent particular segments of Egyptian society. However, the media, military 
and state officials attempted to galvanise public opinion through the women’s rights 
question and characterise people as either ‘religious by nature’ or ‘loyal to military’. 
This shows that claims that culture and religion are the bases for women’s acceptable 
practices or rights are clearly defunct. Instead, it appears that gender normative 
ideology played a crucial role in the politics of the counter revolution and regime 
restoration. Furthermore, it confirms the relationship between power politics and the 
reproduction of gender norms.  
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 The image –  dancers of the election– constitutes another aspect of alienating women’s 
political acts; women were commodified, treated as an object, and their act of 
revolution objectified as divergent from men’s human activity. Thus, such image 
cannot be seen outside the alienation and estrangement of women from politics. 
However, in this vein and political phase, women’s essence of humanity was alienated. 
The objectification of women and their role in politics meant to separate women from 
the entire process of revolution-making and relocate their position outside humanity. In 
other words, women’s interests and roles in political processes are shown as more 
intrinsic, as related to their natural characteristics, and thus different from that of men. 
By so doing, regimes and non-state actors aimed to isolate those who continue to rebel 
against the state and objectify acts in which it is possible to reproduce gender normative 
knowledge about women. Such objectification was intended to influence public 
opinion, making the public intolerant to those who continue to speak of change and 
revolution.   
 
Conclusion		
	
I argued in this article that the reproduction of gender norms was a necessity for the 
restoration of old regimes of power, and hence forms the foundation of the region’s 
political order. Rather than offering a cultural and religious construction of gender 
norms, I attempted to uncover the political, ideological and material conditions that 
sought to exclude women from politics by repudiating their roles in the revolution-
making. Through offering a gendered political reading of the concept of alienation, I 
examined political practices of gender normativity, during and in the post-Arab 
revolution in Egypt, through which order is restored and maintained. I have argued that 
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the alienation of women from their own revolution, which – even albeit taking on 
different forms and trajectories – was consistent throughout. 
 
I introduced three modes of alienation- externalising and exceptionalising, subjugating 
of revolutionary women and objectification of their acts that regime and counter-
revolution deployed to disconnect women from politics: distinguishing ‘good’ women 
from the ‘bad’; allowing the punishment of those deemed alien to women’s ‘culturally 
authentic’ acts; and forcing women closer to the idealised normative image of 
femininity, which, consequently, pushed women away from politics, deprived them of 
celebrating their role in revolutions, and disconnected them from their own contribution 
to revolution-making. By tearing women away from the results of their revolution, their 
capacities, ideas, power, and purpose in life is objectivised. 
Whilst forms of alienation differed in various political phases and often contradicted 
each other, the intent of each form of alienation was to show a defect, a mistake in 
women’s acts, and thus establish the supposedly ‘correct’ characteristics of women 
protesters based on women’s intrinsic nature. Through this, gender normativity was 
reproduced to serve the political class(s)’s specific interests, determining the linkages 
between the alienation of women from politics and the alienation of the revolution from 
its people, and the entire sphere of politics. 
One of the central arguments of this article is that the regime and counter-revolution 
had played off gender norms in a way that they were unconcerned with protecting 
normative masculinity and femininity when political and economic interests are at 
stake. In such situations, as I have shown in the cases of women dancers of the elections 
and the de-masculinisation of the image of ibin elbalad in mop sexual assaults, state 
sacrifices some of its own gender norms to reinforce new ones that suit its 
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politics.  Consequently, state’s discourse of the proclaimed gender norms, as derived 
from religious and cultural values, is actually quite fragile, and could be contested, 
particularly during crisis and in a time of political disruption.   As strategies of 
alienation instrumentalise gender normative ideology – alongside other ideologies – in 
non-static, sometimes contradictory, forms and practices, it is important to continually 
develop the capacity to confront contradictions and deconstruct these fluctuating 
processes of reproducing knowledge about women. In addition, it is also necessary to 
expose hegemony’s means of alienating people through turning their lives to the 
abstract; where merely staying alive becomes the purpose of existence, rather than ‘life 
being an opportunity’ to desire, hope, work, and demand change.  
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